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The Politics of Playing Along: Radio and
Regulation in Democratic Europe
Elsa Costa e Silva and Ana Isabel Reis
The loss of localism has been a common trend in most radio markets in Europe
and the United States. Deregulation of ownership led to a concentration
phenomenon that has affected local radios in several western democracies.
New forms of regulation have been considered as possible ways to stop the
erosion of localism by applying rules to markets in the defense of diversity,
pluralism, and the local dimension. This article analyses the local radio market
in Portugal, by assessing the changes in the legislation and by examining the
regulatory action that can, according to its remit, act preventively to avoid
market forces to harm these principles.
Introduction
Local radio has been under several pressures in most democratic countries in the past
decades. The 2007–08 financial crisis exacerbated the trends of economic difficulties
and job losses in radio companies, but the consolidation of local markets, with the
consequent downsizing, preceded the global wave of economic and financial break-
downs. Bearing a history of uneven development around the world (Buckley, 2000),
radio has a pervasive and almost invisible nature that is a worldwide characteristic.
Radio is believed to provide a medium of excellence to promote local public spheres
(Crider, 2012), to deliver meaningful contributions to media diversity and democracy
(Evens & Paulussen, 2012), and to encourage local dialogues (Buckley, 2000).
Localism is a critical factor when analyzing the radio universe. Local content and
ownership have been closely associated with the concept, a crucial rationale for
justifying radio regulation and the close control of corporate operations taking place
in the radio market. In democratic Europe, where state regulation is a current
practice, though with different approaches, a more interventionist policy was a
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traditional stance taken, mostly until the 1980s, in order to enhance media pluralism,
defend localism, or prevent undue concentration (Freedman, 2008). Even in more
market-driven contexts, like the United States, regulation has been central in the
discourse of the FCC (Sauls & Greer, 2007).
Despite a regulatory framework aimed at preserving diversity, the loss of localism has
been the prevailing trend, especially since the 1990s. Deregulation of markets in western
economies relaxed the limits on ownership, and the consolidation of media markets
concentrated radio stations in the hands of fewer owners. Portugal was no exception,
even though radio activity was kept under the control of the state as it continued to be an
operation subject to a public license. The licensing process was de-politicized and is now
run by a media regulatory agency, which analyzes and decides on each operation
individually with the responsibility of safeguarding pluralism, diversity, and localism.
Regulation has come to be seen as an outside force tomarkets that may force corporations
to seek out and serve smaller audiences in the name of localism (Prindle, 2003). So, the
question is: does the existence of regulation, in the form of a regulatory entity, control
market forces in order to maintain localism in radio activity?
Looking at the particular case of the Portuguese radio marketplace, the aim of this
discussion is to assess the effective role of regulation in the defense of localism in
radio, by investigating:
a) How the concept of localism has evolved in the Portuguese legal framework
and the effects of regulation, in terms of radio ownership, programming, and
content.
b) Whether the existence of a strict regulatory mechanism to act a priori has
resulted in a media sector oriented to values of pluralism, diversity, and
localism (the aims of regulation) or in a market-oriented approach that has
benefited radio group consolidation strategies.
This research is based on a document analysis of the main legislative acts that
govern radio markets in Portugal, confronting the legal framework with the concept
of localism, and also of the decisions of the media regulation agency. The approach
of the analysis is one that not only considers,overt acts of regulation but also includes
the effect of non-decision making (Freedman, 2010) which highlights the dynamics
of power in the interplay between state and private media groups.
Radio, Localism and Regulation
Radio is a medium with a distinctive local character. Typically, radio stations are
licensed to local communities, and the aims of broadcasting have long been con-
cerned with servicing local communities in their needs and interests. For Croteau
and Hoynes (2001), localism encompasses two elements: local control and local
content. Following the work of these two authors, Starkey (2012) has presented a
strong case in favor of localism in radio, arguing that locally owned radio stations are
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more prone to be sympathetic to the concerns of the community and more likely to
promote local distinctiveness. Building on Habermas’s configuration of the public
sphere, Crider (2012, p. 242) has argued that “the public sphere, already diminished
to an abstract form by mass media, cannot exist without an outlet for local publics to
receive important local information.” A genuine localism “demands comprehensive
newscasts and plentiful public affairs programming” (Prindle, 2003, p. 317).
The mid-1980s saw important changes in media markets in general. Deregulation
and market liberalization relaxed the rules on media ownership, allowing for con-
centration in most democratic countries in Europe, as well as the United States.
Radio was not exempt from this transformation, which had a similar impact in the
United States following the 1996 Telecommunications Act that opened up local
markets to consolidation (Chambers, 2003; 2011; Polinsky, 2007; Saffran, 2011).
From 1996 to 2002, the number of radio station owners in the United States dropped
by 33.6% (Prindle, 2003). Also, in Europe, media markets were liberalized and
private actors were allowed to invest, grow, and consolidate their positions. The
loss of localism in local broadcasting, namely in the radio sector, has been closely
linked to the deregulation of media markets in terms of ownership. Under the control
of large groups, radio stations in the United States and in the United Kingdom, for
instance, were subject to cost-cutting strategies, namely by replacing more expensive
locally produced shows with syndicated programs (Crider, 2012; Starkey, 2012).
Deregulation of radio markets, boosted by the 1996 Telecommunications Act, has
led to a concentration of radio formats (Chambers, 2003), and this consolidation,
which was “never seen before,” was described as “fully impacting local coverage”
(Sauls & Greer, 2007, p. 39).
The most studied example of radio consolidation is the local radio market in the United
States, but the phenomenon is not unique and has many examples in Europe. Though less
documented, ownership concentration is a reality in diverse geographic contexts, such as
Belgium (Evens & Paulussen, 2012), the United Kingdom (Starkey, 2012), Spain
(Arboledas & Bonet, 2013) and Portugal (Silva, 2014). This consolidation has brought
about important changes in programming as radio companies, seeking cheaper program-
ming due to financial pressures, have increasingly been providing syndicated national
shows (Crider, 2012).
The radio market in the United States is characterized by the predominance of
large groups of radio stations, especially the most popular stations, and shows little
ownership of a local nature (Chambers, 2011). Concentration of ownership has
negatively impacted the diversity of formats (Chambers, 2003), and thus has resulted
in an inadequate response of “local radio stations in meeting its obligation to serve
local communities” (Saffran, 2011, p. 292). Starkey (2012), in reference to the
context of the United Kingdom, points out that the local character of radio has
been declining since the mid-90s and that, even if this distinctiveness may be
more expensive when “compared to the relative cheapness of generic imaging and
content, (but) the preservation of heritage—both cultural and radiophonic—may yet
be worth considerable effort and expenditure as well as political will” (Starkey, 2012,
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p. 178). This political will, if it exists, can be expressed under strict rules for the
safeguard of localism, namely by regulatory mechanisms.
Media regulation, assuming different configurations, is a widespread reality with a
general aim to increase accountability towards society. The most common form is state
regulation, in particular in the audiovisual sector. The audiovisual model of regulation,
established since radio began regular broadcasts, is characterized by high levels of
restriction, for reasons of a technical nature and to assure a balanced distribution of
scarce resources (McQuail, 2003, p. 209). Primary forms of radio regulation are related
to spectrum allocation (Aitken, 1994) and to the compensation due to the states for its
use. With commercial radio, a new regulatory function arose for national authorities,
that of securing effective competition within the available spectrum (Withers, 1999).
Besides addressing technical specificities, policy formation in the media sector is
“generally guided by a notion of the ‘public interest,’” which democratic states are
expected to pursue on behalf of their citizens (Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003, p. 182).
This perspective of media regulation, mostly common in European democratic
countries, is framed within some kind of interventionist approach that is comprised
of active policies to highlight the importance of various political views and cultural
values (Karpinnen, 2006), while the competition approach only considers govern-
ment intervention to prevent or solve market failure (Evens & Paulussen, 2012).
Although this distinction presents a clear division between these two approaches,
policy and regulatory actions of countries have been oscillating (not always coher-
ently) between these two perspectives. Tension between intervention and non-inter-
vention, as well as between different levels of intervention, has been central in policy
action in most western countries (Freedman, 2010).
This tension has been more prominent in democratic Europe, being one of the
rationales used to justify the existence of regulatory agencies. These “are the result of
an ideological shift from social-democratic systems in Western Europe, and from
communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, to free-market, neoliberal social
arrangements which involved the deregulation of many areas of the economy, and
society in general” (Jakubowicz, 2013, p. xii). Intended to protect institutions, these
independent agencies have also been considered part of a shift in the governance of
societies towards a more complex and diffuse process of decision and policy-making
(Hamelink & Nordenstreng, 2007). Regulatory entities have been set up in Europe to
protect freedom of expression under the assumption that “they move the regulatory
function out of the purview of the administrative hierarchy in support of the pre-
sumption of non-interference by the state” (Irion & Radu, 2013, p. 18).
However, private actors have been quite reluctant in accepting State regulatory
actions, particularly those that impact localism (Sauls, 2011, p. 315). This opposition
from private media groups to any form of regulation may be one of the reasons “the
majority of European countries have failed to create any political awareness of the
social and cultural potential of local radio” (Evens & Paulussen, 2012, p. 117), thus
leading to a gap in terms of subsequent regulatory procedures and policies.
Regulating the media is not only about what is done in terms of the legal and
regulatory framework, but also a matter of what could have been done and was
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not. Freedman (2010) argues that any analysis of media regulation must account not
only for the overt acts of regulation and policy, but also for the policy silence and the
passive act of non-decision making, as a way to illuminate dynamics of power.
Power, in this sense, “involves the capacity to mobilize one set of interests against
another set of interests” (Freedman, 2010, p. 350).
The Portuguese Radio System
Portugal has a very distinctive radio system. From the mid-1970s, following the
democratic revolution of 1974, a dualistic model offered citizens programming from
a public station and from a private operator, owned by the Catholic Church. This
situation persisted until the end of the 1980s, when thousands of pirate radio stations
disrupted the spectrum and forced the authorities to act. Pirate stations, also called
free radios, presented a very different way to interact with the audience, providing
innovative playlists, and a new language of proximity, namely in terms of informa-
tion and news (Bonixe, 2003). In order to legalize the situation, in 1988 the govern-
ment launched a map of 402 local frequencies (to municipalities) and a licensing
process, under a law known as the local radio law. From the following year on, the
government authorized 312 local operators to broadcast. In 1990, two regional
frequencies (one for the north of the country, another for the south) were licensed,
thus completing the frame of radio activity in Portugal. But the process of licensing
was considered to be political, rather than based on the soundness of the candidates’
projects (Reis & Nunes, 1994), and criticisms arose immediately, as the available
advertising revenue to invest in radio was considered to be far too insufficient to
accommodate the number of licenses granted. Many local radio stations indeed
faced severe economic difficulties in the years to come (Santos, 2008), with stations
closing down or having to join others in order to gain critical mass.
In the 90s, the phenomenon of local broadcasting was a consolidated reality in
Portuguese media, even though some stations faced economic instability, and the
rural zones of the country were not as well served as urban settings. At the same
time, another significant development began to emerge: the establishment of retrans-
mission chains of local broadcasters that, in some cases, meant colonization by
stronger stations, and thus lead to a loss of their characteristic local distinctiveness
(Reis & Nunes, 1994). This practice was contested by the government and by some
actors within the radio sector, but the attempts to regulate this situation were unable
to stop the retransmission chains. In 2001, a new law was passed imposing obliga-
tions on operators in terms of providing local news (making it mandatory for stations
to have three daily newscasts) in addition to their own programming. However, it did
not prevent much of the retransmission practice. The debate continued at the
beginning of the new millennium, also focusing on the weaknesses of local broad-
casting, including market issues and financial sustainability.
Portugal currently has three major players in terms of radio, the first one being
the state, within the public broadcasting service, with three national programming
134 Journal of Radio & Audio Media/May 2017
services (one with news and music for adults [Antena 1], another mainly musical
station for teenagers and young adults [Antena 3], and another with classical
music, [Antena 2]). The Catholic Church owns the RCOM group that has two
national programming services (one [RR] with news and music for adults and
another, [RFM] mainly musical station for adults), and two other services with a
national reach but broadcast through local frequencies (Radio Sim for the elderly
and Mega FM for teenagers and young adults). Media Capital, a private group
owned by the Spanish media group Prisa (also a major radio player in Spain with
Cadena Ser), has a national programming service (Rádio Comercial) and four other
programming services based on local frequencies with a reach that ranges from
national (like M80 and Rádio Cidade) to metropolitan areas (like Vodafone FM or
Smooth).
Another important player (mainly in terms of advertising investment) is the national
news programming service TSF (belonging to Global Media, a national multimedia
group), which transmits in a regional frequency in the North and uses local fre-
quency in the center and south of the country.
Radio activity is regulated by the ERC (Entidade Reguladora para a
Comunicação Social), the Portuguese media regulation agency. This regulator,
which can be included in the trend of democratic Europe to set independent
administrative bodies to regulate different sectors of economic activity (Tatcher,
2002), was created by law in 2005, with increased powers and a wider scope,
namely in terms of sanctioning wrongdoings and in preventing concentration.
Since launching new press services is free (only subject to registry), the ERC’s
scope of action includes mainly radio (by licensing and authorizing changes in
programming) and television (by monitoring compliance of private broadcasters
and public service with obligations in terms of entertainment and news services
legally broadcast). It is also responsible for enforcing in all media the “right to
reply” (a constitutional right to demand the rectification of any misinformation by
the same medium in which it was published or broadcast). The rationale for the
new architecture of media regulation was to increase its effectiveness, namely by
consigning specific powers with respect to ownership and concentration, and to
raise its legitimacy by stressing the independence of the body from governmental
influence. Its council board is composed of five elements, four of them designed
by the parliament (in a combined deal between the two main political parties).
Law 53/2005 established that the ERC has to control the concentration of owner-
ship of entities pursuing media activities when pluralism and diversity are at stake.
However, Portugal has no pluralism or concentration law with a specific mechan-
ism for setting limits to concentration, and the wording of the 53/2005 law is
merely qualitative (see Silva, 2007). This limits the scope of the ERCs remit, as it is
very unspecific, but in principle, it could also be transformed into an advantage if
the council board was to assume a more comprehensive understanding of the
legal possibilities.
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The Portuguese Radio Market: Analysis of the Regulatory Action
Evaluating the Legal and Regulatory Context
The current configuration of national radio groups is the result of changes in the
legal framework that took place over the last 25 years, a period of time in which most
media legislation was shaped after the Portuguese democratic revolution of 1974. In
the particular case of radio, the legal framework has undergone significant changes
in terms of the defense of localism, limits to concentration, and obligations to
provide news outlets.
In the first radio law of the democratic regime, Law no. 87/88 (Lei no. 87/88, 30
Julho), passed in 1988, localism was very present. Operators, according to Article 6,
were expressly obliged to meet the concerns, modes of expression, and cultural
values of local communities, as well as to broadcast information of interest to the
geographical range of the audience. In 2001, the new law (Lei no. 4/2001, de 23 de
Fevereiro) shortened all these obligations to a simple formulation that only included
programming targeted at the audience of the geographical space to which the license
was given (Article 9). In 2010, another new law (Lei no. 54/2010, de 24 de
Dezembro) was passed, and this formulation was maintained with two small but
relevant changes: information was included in the programming obligations, but the
specific allocation to the geographical context of the audience disappeared (Article
12). Audience is now a generic concept and not the group of listeners of a specific
locality, which has obviously handicapped the localism reach of this law of a very
relevant dimension. Another important change of this law which, again, cut off the
close connection of radio to a local community is the fact that local stations are no
longer obliged to have an establishment in the municipality to which the frequency
was licensed. A physical presence is no longer required, and this is quite relevant in
a context of syndicated programming, as it allows media groups to have only a
centralized production center. Local contact is thus lost, and radio workers lack
direct knowledge of local concerns and voices, which directly impacts their ability to
share information of relevance with the audience of the geographical area of cover-
age. This is problematic considering that “locally produced content enable local
citizens to access producers directly, so that content can better reflect local distinc-
tiveness and cultural diversity, promote audience involvement in local discourse and
thereby stimulate local participation and democracy” (Starkey, 2012, p. 168).
In terms of ownership, changes were always made in order to relax the limits, which
has increased the possibility of concentration. Within the licensing process permitted by
Law no. 87/88, ownership of broadcasters was limited to 30% of a second broadcaster
(no. 5 of Article 2). But this significantly changed in the next legislative process: Law 4/
2001 increased the number of operators under the same owner to five (Article 7). This
changewas a significant step forward for the establishment of radio groups. This law also
sought to address the issue of retransmission—another de facto way to promote con-
centration, even though not under formal ownership agreements. The association
136 Journal of Radio & Audio Media/May 2017
between music or news programs subordinated to the same model was allowed to a
limit of four operators (Article 30). For nearly a decade, this legal framework did not stop
radio groups from growing, bypassing the legal restrictions by the use of intermediary
organizations (Silva, 2004; Santos, 2005).
Again the legal framework had to adjust to the market reality, and another change in
the law extended the possibilities of concentration. Law no. 54/2010 set the limit for
licenses under the same owner at 10% of the total existing licenses (no. 3 of Article 4).
This meant that the limits were extended from five to more than thirty licenses.
This is not, however, an automatic allowance to media groups. In fact, operations
of ownership have to be individually authorized by the ERC. The current radio law,
in its Article 4, establishes that the ERC may prohibit, through a binding decision,
concentration operations that constitute “a risk to free expression and confrontation
of differing points of view,” when the previous regulator could only issue advisory
opinions and had no jurisdiction over concentration of ownership. The ERC is also
responsible, according to the law, for authorizing retransmissions of programming
within a partnership agreement or by means of an association of broadcasters
(Articles 10 and 11). The main difference between these two legal configurations is
that the association, new in the legal radio framework, allows for a 24-hour retrans-
mission, while the partnership only permits a maximum of 16 hours of retransmis-
sion. The maximum operators associated is limited to six broadcasters, but there is no
limit to the number of partner operators, nor are these two legal figures mutually
exclusive. This is why, for instance, a national station called M80, broadcast by the
major radio group in Portugal (Media Capital), is retransmitted by one regional
frequency and 18 local frequencies.
Another significant change brought about by the law was the possibility for
operators to create thematic programming, which excuses them from meeting obli-
gations in terms of the inclusion of Portuguese music in the playlists and of present-
ing three daily news services (Article 8). This means that thematic local broadcasters
are no longer obliged to offer local news to their audiences, thus failing to accom-
plish one of the main elements of localism: local content. The combination of being
a thematic radio station and broadcasting in association with a centralized produc-
tion center is fatal to local news production. As stated by Crider (2012, p. 229), the
fact that “programming decisions are made at corporate headquarters and passed
down to the regional levels and eventually to the local markets” means that “this lack
of control ultimately affects the amount of local control.”
It is now clear that the trend in Portugal, in terms of the legal possibilities for radio
activity, is the loss of localism, which was enhanced either by relaxation in terms of
ownership, allowing for an increase in concentration, or by the loosening of obliga-
tions in terms of the broadcasting of local content. However, one thing is the legal
possibility to consolidate (ownership and programming), another is the authorization
to do so. Each operation has to be formally authorized by the ERC within the legal
framework, and there is room to negotiate: operations aiming at the concentration of
media companies can be prevented if there is a risk to freedom of speech or to the
presentation of different points of view; the transformation into a thematic
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programming service should be authorized only after considering its potential impact
on the diversity and pluralism of the programming on offer in the geographical
coverage area, and on the local news.
The question now is how to assess the level of interference of the regulatory
agency in the market dynamics in terms of safeguarding pluralism and localism, by
evaluating how the ERC has used the mechanisms legally displayed to prevent
consolidation of programming and ownership. Considering the policy analysis pro-
posed by Freeman (2010), the act of non-decision-making and policy silences in the
radio sector will be discussed in order to shed light on the dynamics of power and
the interplay between the state and private players.
Regulation in Action
In a previous study of the ERC’s decisions in relation to radio ownership and
activity, Silva (2014) presents evidence that the Portuguese media regulator endorsed
the increased concentration in radio broadcasting—in some cases, with formal own-
ership transfer, but in others just by authorizing an agreement between the central
radio station and local companies. This second mechanism is very important in the
period of analysis from 2008 to 2011, as there was, until the end of 2010, a very
strict limitation on the concentration of ownership (up to five radio operators). The
ERC issued 43 authorizations to retransmit centrally broadcast content on local
frequencies, and the weight of national media groups in those transactions increased
with the allowance of the regulator entity.
As we have seen, the new radio law of 2010 significantly altered the limits to
concentration of ownership and to the association between operators for syndicated
programming, and allowed operators to forego regular newscasts and local informa-
tion. Since it was passed at the end of that year (December 24, 2010), it only
produced effects, in terms of the legal framework, in 2011. This gives the period of
2011 and following years a particular scenario for the ERC to stress its positioning in
face of the market’s force. The ERC’s website displays the processes and decisions
adopted by the board, thus allowing for the monitoring of its decisions on the
requirements presented by the media groups..
So, in order to evaluate how the ERC has used the mechanisms legally dis-
played to prevent consolidation of programming and ownership, the regulators’
decisions from 2011 to 2014 were individually analyzed. In this period, the ERC
issued 132 decisions (individual links are not listed as the number is too large,
but can be retrieved from the ERC’s site by a search of radio authorizations)
specifically related to authorizations request to changes in ownership or program-
ming of local frequencies. Considering that in Portugal there were, at the end of
2014 and according to the ERC, 323 local frequencies, this means that in that
period the ERC evaluated requests related to 40% of the local radio universe in
Portugal.
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Table 1 shows the distribution of authorization requests, organized by type of
operation. It highlights the fact that radio owners were quite willing to act upon the
new legal possibilities and that the consolidation of markets, either by ownership
transactions or by syndicating programming, was pursued intensively.
Out of all requests submitted to the ERC, only eight were denied authorization.
However, none of these denials had to do with the responsibility of the regulator to
safeguard pluralism or localism. All the refusals were linked to technicalities: in
seven cases (in 2011), the authorizations were denied because of legal impediments
(the fact that new changes in programming or ownership could only occur two years
after the last modification), and in another case, in 2014, the denial was due to a
possible technical overlap of regional and local frequencies. The fact that the ERC
was not acting upon any consideration for localism or pluralism is proved by the fact
that the authorizations were granted when media owners presented the 2011
requests again (in 2013).
So, all the operations presented by the radio owners were authorized, thus high-
lighting that the ERC shadowed market forces at the expense of localism: by deciding
positively on 40 ownership concentrations in the period, allowing for the growth of
syndicated programming, and also by authorizing local operators to change to
musical programming with no newscast obligations. In these kinds of operations, it
is useful to note that the justifications presented by the regulator to decide on the
requests were not coherent. In some cases, the change to musical programming was
authorized because it would not affect the diversity of the offer, as other operators in
the region had general programming. But when there was not any other operator
with general programming, requests were nonetheless authorized on the grounds
that local news could be provided by digital services, such as Web sites or news-
papers. Even when the operator was the only one in the municipality, the ERC held
that the change to thematic programming could enhance diversification of radio
choices.
In terms of the distribution of the local frequencies targeted by the changes, the
processes show a concentration in the coastal areas, conurbations and the two major
metropolitan areas of the country (Lisbon and Porto), which indicates a clear
Table 1
Processes Analyzed by ERC; Own Elaboration Based on Data Retrieved From ERC’s Site
Authorizations Requested 2011 2012 2013 2014
Processes (one process can include more
than one operation)
23 26 49 17
Ownership Single Transaction 2 10 11 6
Concentration 14 5 18 3
Programming Retransmission 1 4 16 5
Thematic (only music, no local news) 6 8 22 4
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indifference by the major media groups to the interior of the country and a focus on
the areas providing larger audiences. Thus, while interior radio stations still tend to
maintain a generalist type of programming and local news, more densely populated
areas are less likely to have something similar.
Some operations were requested by small-scale radio groups (up to five operators
normally in the same region and broadcasting in association) and by two median
scale radio groups, that, curiously, did not follow a retransmission strategy. One is
Música no Coração/Lusocanal, a radio group that is also a live entertainment
company, and that controls 12 frequencies for 9 programming services, and the
other is Global Difusion, a group linked to a religious movement started in Brazil,
that directly controls 10 local frequencies and has arrangements for shared shows
(with religious purposes).
Looking now at the biggest players in terms of the radio market, two groups (Rádio
Renascença and Global Media) kept a low profile in the period of analysis. In fact,
RR asked the ERC to analyze eight operations involving changes in ownership and
programming, but involving only three operators. Global Media and the brand TSF
bought two operators in the Portuguese offshore territory (Madeira and Azores) and
linked a local frequency to its news programming. It tried, in 2014, to buy a local
operator, but that operation was denied due to technicalities in the spectrum
coverage.
The third big private player, the Media Capital group, was, on the contrary, very
dynamic during the analysis period and was the one that took most advantage of the
new law. Although it officially owns only one national frequency, one regional, and
16 local operators, the group controls up to 36 local frequencies to retransmit its five
programming services. Besides the national service, Rádio Comercial, Media Capital
has another station with national coverage (M80), two programmers reaching most of
metropolitan and urban areas in Portugal (Cidade and Smooth), and another
(Vodafone) that broadcasts to the two most important Portuguese cities. The year
2013 was particularly important for Media Capital. After having completed the two-
year window introduced by the law of 2010, the radio group launched a major
organization of its radio outlet, nationally consolidating the M80 brand and estab-
lishing the brand Smooth.
Media Capital was the one that benefited the most from the legal changes, shutting
down establishments all over the country associated with the local frequencies.
Although it is a group with solid financial health, and thus one with more economic
resources to supply and maintain structures to provide local news, it has been the
most active in taking advantage of the legal figures of legal mechanisms, such as
association and partnership, and changes to thematic stations, to escape obligations
to provide newscasts and be locally present. Media Capital acquired the ownership
of 13 more local operators, asked for retransmission of 17 stations (either with a
partnership or in association) and for 19 changes from generalist to thematic pro-
gramming. All were authorized. This means that about 40% of all the ERC’s rulings
during the analysis period regarding the radio market originated with Media Capital.
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Conclusion
In light of the proposed model of political action analysis of Freedman (2010), the
policy silences of the ERC regarding localism resulted in a market structured accord-
ing to the strategies of media groups. The ERC could have denied authorizations to
the transformation of operators into thematic radio stations, especially in areas where
no other option in terms of radio was available, considering that its role is to “safe-
guard an information component of local nature.” The non-decision making attitude
of the ERC is even more striking considering that, in a previous moment, the agency
issued a document for public consultation on the promotion of information diversity
in radio (ERC, 2012), thus showing its awareness to the problem. However, the
document was not turned into regulation, and the intents of the regulator simply
disappeared. Regulation can have a role in defending localism, and the law opened
up this possibility, but the ERC was a willing partner to market forces. In the interplay
between public interest and private strategies, the interests of the media group
prevailed in a context where the legal frame was tailored to fulfill its needs, and
the ERC just played along.
In fact, legal documents concerning the radio market evolved in Portugal in a
way that favored the private interests and lead to the loss of localism: in owners
and in content, especially news and information. Concentration of ownership and
consolidation of programming services were increasingly permitted over the last
25 years, and the existence of a structured regulation entity that can act a priori
did not prove to be enough in terms of setting a media sector oriented toward
values of pluralism, diversity and localism—which is why regulation was said to
exist in the first place. Considering the long-lasting difficulties of local radio,
mainly due to insufficient advertising revenues, the regulator adopted a market-
oriented approach that has benefited radio group consolidation strategies and
cost-cutting measures.
The ERC’s performance concerning the radio market may raise the question of
how an independent regulatory body could be more willing to endorse the
interests of major commercial players in the market, instead of defending legal
requirements of pluralism, diversity and localism clearly formulated. First, there is
a historical and political context to consider. In a country where concentration of
ownership has always been positively considered in terms of political discourse
(Sousa & Silva, 2009; Silva, 2004), a mandate to defend pluralism and localism
did not seem enough to lead the ERC to a more energetic defense of these
principles in radio activity. Second, most civil society has not been mindful of
the changes introduced in the market and, except for some concerns expressed by
the Journalists’ Union, no civic organization or movement has promoted any
concerted action to create awareness of this issue. There has been no national
debate on radio (even less about local radio) suggesting that this has been a
mostly silent process driven by an economic rationale, at the expense of local
diversity and cultural pluralism.
Silva and Reis/RADIO AND REGULATION IN DEMOCRATIC EUROPE 141
ORCID
Elsa Costa e Silva http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7215-6384
References
Aitken, H. G. (1994). Allocating the spectrum: The origins of radio regulation. Technology and
Culture, 686–716.
Arboledas, L., & Bonet, M. (2013). Radio on the Iberian Peninsula: Autarky, revolution and
convergence. International Communication Gazette, 75, 205–224.
Bonixe, L. (2003). As rádios locais em Portugal: Informação e função social -Uma análise dos
noticiários das rádios do distrito de Setúbal. Dissertação de Mestrado defendida na
Universidade Nova de Lisboa.
Buckley, S. (2000). Radio’s new horizons Democracy and popular communication in the digital
age. International Journal of Cultural Studies, 3, 180–187.
Chambers, T. (2003). Radio programming diversity in the era of consolidation. Journal of Radio
Studies, 10, 33–45.
Chambers, T. (2011). Local ownership and radio market structure. Journal of Radio & Audio
Media, 18, 263–280.
Crider, D. (2012). A public sphere in decline: The state of localism in talk radio. Journal of
Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 56, 225–244.
Croteau, D., & Hoynes, W. (2001). The business of media: Corporate media and the public
interest. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.
Cuilenburg, J. van, & McQuail, D. (2003). Media policy paradigm shifts: Towards a new
communications policy paradigm. European Journal of Communication, 18, 181–207.
ERC. (2012). Deliberação 1/OUT-R/2012, accessible at http://www.erc.pt/download/
YToyOntzOjg6ImZpY2hlaXJvIjtzOjM5OiJtZWRpYS9kZWNpc29lcy9vYmplY3RvX29mZmx
pbmUvMTk4OC5wZGYiO3M6NjoidGl0dWxvIjtzOjIyOiJkZWxpYmVyYWNhby0xb3V0LXI
yMDEyIjt9/deliberacao-1out-r2012.
Evens, T., & Paulussen, S. (2012). Local radio in Europe: Policy options for a sustainable sector.
Media, Culture & Society, 34, 112–121.
Freedman, D. (2008). The politics of media policy. Cambridge/Malden, MA: Polity Press.
Freedman, D. (2010). Media policy silences: The hidden face of communications decision
making. International Journal of Press/Politics, 15, 344–361.
Hamelink, C. J., & Nordenstreng, K. (2007). Towards democratic media governance. In E. de
Ben (Ed.),Media between culture and commerce (pp. 225–240). Bristol, UK: Intellect Books.
Hilliard, R. L., & Keith, M .C. (2005). The quieted voice: The rise and demise of localism in
American radio. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Press.
Irion, K., & Radu, R. (2013). Delegation to independent regulatory authorities in the media
sector: a paradigm shift through the lens of regulatory theory. In W. Schultz, P. Valcke, & K.
Irion (Eds.), The independence of the media and its regulatory agencies. Bristol/Chicago, IL:
Intellect.
Jakubowicz, K. (2013). Preface: Broadcasting regulatory authorities: Work in progress. In W.
Schultz, P. Valcke, & K. Irion (Eds.), The independence of the media and its regulatory
agencies. Bristol/Chicago, IL: Intellect.
Karpinnen, K. (2006). Media diversity and the politics of criteria diversity assessment and
technocratisation of European media policy. Nordicom Review, 27, 53–68.
McQuail, D. (2003). Teoria da Comunicação de Massas. Lisbon, Portugal: Fundação Calouste
Gulbenkian.
Prindle, G. M. (2003). No competition: How radio consolidation has diminished diversity and
sacrificed localism. Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal,
14, 279–325.
142 Journal of Radio & Audio Media/May 2017
Reis, A., & Nunes, J. M. (1994). Os meios de comunicação social—breve síntese sobre a
evolução dos media no período 87–94. In A. Reis (Coord), Portugal 20 anos de democracia.
Lisbon, Portugal: Círculo de Leitores.
Saffran, M. J. (2011). Remarks on radio localism. Journal of Radio & Audio Media, 18, 246–247.
Santos, R. (2005). Rádio em Portugal: Tendências e grupos de comunicação na actualidade.
Comunicação e Sociedade—Economia Política dos Media, 7, 137–152.
Santos, R. (2008). Rádios locais em Portugal, 2000–2004. In M. Pinto & S. Marinho (org.)Osmedia
em Portugal nos primeiros cinco anos do século XXI. Porto, Portugal: Campo das Letras.
Sauls, S. J. (2011). Locally and free: What broadcast radio still provides. Journal of Radio &
Audio Media, 18, 309–318.
Sauls, S. J., & Greer, D. (2007). Radio and localism: Has the FCC dropped the ball? Journal of
Radio Studies, 14, 37–48.
Silva, E. C. (2004). Os donos da Notícia—A concentração da propriedade dos media em
Portugal. Porto, Portugal: Porto Editora.
Silva, E. C. (2007). Concentração: os desafios à entidade reguladora da comunicação social.
Comunicação e Sociedade, 11, 87–98.
Silva, E. C. (2014). Crisis, financialization and regulation: The case of media industries in
Portugal. The Political Economy of Communication, 2, 47–60.
Sousa, H., & Silva E. C. (2009). Keeping up appearances—Regulating media diversity in
Portugal. International Communication Gazette, 71, 89–100.
Starkey, G. (2012). Live and local no more? Listening communities and globalising trends in the
ownership and production of local radio. In M. Oliveira, P. Portela & L. A. Santos (Eds.),
Radio Evolution: ECREA Conference Proceedings (pp. 167–178). Braga, Portugal:
Communication and Society Research Centre.
Tatcher, M. (2002). Delegation to independent regulatory agencies: Pressures, functions and
contextual mediation. West European Politics, 25, 125–147.
Wall, T. (2000). Policy, pop, and the public: The discourse of regulation in British commercial
radio. Journal of Radio Studies, 7, 180–195.
Withers, D. J. (1999). Radio spectrum management: management of the spectrum and regula-
tion of radio services, (No. 45), IET.
Silva and Reis/RADIO AND REGULATION IN DEMOCRATIC EUROPE 143
